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ABSTRACT -  This paper argues that the acceptance of two recent methodological advances in 
economics, namely game theory and laboratory experimentation, was affected by the history 
dependence constraining the formalization of economics. After an early period in which the two 
methods were coolly received by economists because their applications challenged some basic 
hypotheses of mainstream economics, their subsequent acceptance was the result of the 
corroboration of those same hypotheses. However, the recent emergence of some paradoxes has 
finally revealed that the effectiveness of game theory and experimental techniques in economics is 
improved when descriptively implausible and normatively unsatisfactory assumptions such as the 
centrality of individual maximization in decision theory and the definition of rationality as 
consistency in preferences are revised. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
A common view in modern controversies over mathematical formalism in economics is that 
mathematics is not a neutral tool but a language with a peculiar interpretative framework quite 
distinct from economics. The introduction of formal assumptions and analytical methods into 
economic models may lead to unintended theoretical outcomes. This lack of awareness may 
influence the interpretation of the model, which can become self-referential and lacking in 
empirical meaning. 
This issue could be dealt with by making the rhetoric of economics explicit. By revealing 
the implicit assumptions hidden by the model’s mathematical symbols or by dissecting the literary 
translation of deductive reasoning, economists could fully recognize the concrete implications of 
their theories. 
Another way of dealing with the issue is to learn from historical reconstruction how 
economics was affected by this methodological feature. If this approach were applied to recent 
developments, historical analysis could redirect the frontiers of the discipline towards more 
consciously chosen targets. Although the privileged perspective of historians may be biased, it 
gives historians an advantage over theorists for evaluating the real incidence of the drawbacks of 
formalization. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the formalization of economics had reached such a 
level that it is hardly surprising that historians of economics were becoming increasingly concerned 
that formal mathematical reasoning could be detrimental to economic analysis.1 Nevertheless, the 
consequences of this lack of commensurability between economics and mathematics have not been 
fully assessed. Specifically, the presumptive separation between models and empirical analysis due 
to axiomatics induces mathematical economists to underrate or even evade the empirical 
plausibility of their theories. They preserve their assumptions against factual counterarguments by 
inculcating in their methodology a sort of rigidity that is reminiscent of Lakatos’ hard core but that 
can be better identified as a sort of history dependence. When the mainstream community is 
generally agreed on the effectiveness of a mathematical procedure or formal assumption, this is 
placed in the black box of accepted postulates and treated as irrefutable. Exhibiting similarities with 
                                                 
1 The claim that mathematics is a language that needs only to be translated to effectuate proper economic applications 
has been criticized on the basis of historical arguments by, among others, Ingrao and Israel (1987), Clower (1995), 
Backhouse (1998), Blaug (1999), Mirowski (2002), Weintraub (2002), Blaug (2003), Giocoli (2003), and Rosser 
(2003). 2 
the effect of path dependence in biological and social processes, the formalist revolution in 
economics has been affected since its inception by a “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” 
(Liebowitz and Margolis 1995b, p. 210), which has hindered rather than promoted methodological 
innovations. This interpretation would justify, for example, the charge of “innocuous 
falsificationism” made by Blaug (1980, p. 259) about the methodology of economics or the 
disregard shown by economists for the use of spatial models (Krugman 1995, pp. 64–65). 
This paper intends to provide historical evidence to support this view. Specifically, the 
introduction of two methodological advances in economics, namely game theory and experimental 
techniques, was affected by the history dependence constraining the evolution of mathematical 
economics. After an early period in which the two innovative methods were coolly received by 
economists because their applications challenged some basic assumptions of conventional 
economics, their subsequent acceptance was the result of the corroboration of those same 
hypotheses. However, the recent emergence of some paradoxes, i.e., deep-seated contradictions 
between theoretical predictions and empirical inferences, has finally revealed that the effectiveness 
of game theory and laboratory activity in economics is improved when descriptively implausible 
and normatively unsatisfactory assumptions such as the maximization of individual choice and the 
consistency in preferences as a requisite of economic rationality are revised. 
After preliminary discussion of a recent definition of the methodology of economics that 
sets the framework for the ensuing historical interpretation, this paper describes the changing 
features of game theory and experimental economics as a reaction to the core beliefs of mainstream 
economics. An overview of the latest developments shows how the recent emergence of paradoxes 
has led to the questioning of the validity of the same long-standing hypotheses of economic theory. 
 
2. SOME PRELIMINARY NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
Methodological issues in economics are rarely clear-cut. When one goes through the 
definitions of the many approaches to economic theory, one’s first impression is that boundaries 
dividing the various schools of thought are often uncertain or confused. Consequently, a 
preliminary question is how dividing lines can be drawn. The same distinction between orthodox 
and heterodox methodologies is difficult to make. To provide a framework for analysis, I address 
this problem by citing a definition that can be considered as an updated version of the methodology 
of mainstream economics, for reasons I discuss subsequently. 3 
In two papers published in leading journals of mathematical economics, Ariel Rubinstein, a 
major contributor to theoretical game theory, attempted to revive the definition of the axiomatic 
approach to economic modeling. In 1991, he focused on the methodology of game theory and 10 
years later on laboratory experimentation, surprisingly using similar arguments.2 In the first paper, 
Rubinstein proposed a “perceptive” interpretation of game theory: 
 
If we adopt the view that a game is not a rigid description of the physical rules of the 
world, then a game-theoretic model should include only those factors which are 
perceived by the players to be relevant. Modeling requires intuition, common sense, and 
empirical data in order to determine the relevant factors entering into the players’ 
strategic considerations and should thus be included in the model. (Rubinstein 1991, p. 
919). 
 
By freeing game theory from the task of describing the physical world, Rubinstein’s 
definition transfers to the theorist’s subjective perception the function of choosing the factors that 
players perceive as relevant. In this way, the game theorist establishes a link with empirical 
knowledge virtually unconstrained because his or her choice can be made without outside 
interference. The acceptability of the model to readers indicates how successfully the theorist 
represents players’ perceptions of real life. However, as these readers are typically other theorists, 
the fact that real players have those perceptions cannot be proven. 
Once this definition is accepted, a fully abstract characterization of game theory is attained, as 
Rubinstein makes clear in these conclusive remarks: 
 
There exists a widespread myth in game theory, which is possible to achieve a 
miraculous prediction regarding the outcome of interaction among human beings using 
only data on the order of events, combined with a description of the players’ 
preferences over the feasible outcomes of the situation. For forty years, game theory has 
searched for the grand solution which would accomplish this task. The mystical and 
vague word ‘rationality’ is used to fuel our hopes of achieving this goal. I fail to see any 
possibility of this being accomplished. Overall, game theory accomplishes only two 
tasks: it builds models based on intuition and uses deductive arguments based on 
mathematical knowledge. Deductive arguments cannot by themselves be used to 
discover truths about the world. (Rubinstein 1991, p. 923). 
 
This call for pure axiomatics to identify the purposes of game theory relieves modeling from 
the quest for a definition of rationality. In essence, Rubinstein’s approach seems reminiscent of the 
Austrian method of thought experiment, which purported to simplify the intricate reasoning needed 
                                                 
2 Thus, it is surprising to read in the later paper the following admission: “If you had asked me 10 years ago about 
experimental economics I probably would have said that I do not see the point of conducting experiments in 4 
to translate the complexity of reality into a simpler set of assumptions. This method proved useful 
mainly for investigating the role of a single important element in a complex system. For instance, 
Moss (1997) defined general equilibrium theory as “the grandest thought experiment in all of 
economics” because the functioning of the whole economic system was subsumed under the 
concept of market equilibrium. In any thought experiment, theories are tested only in the theorist’s 
mind, which plays the role of a virtual laboratory. By definition, there is neither empirical 
confirmation nor refutation of the results of such tests. To quote Rubinstein again from the 
commemoration of Nash’s Nobel Prize: “An economic theoretical model is not required to be tested 
except in our own brain. The art of economic modeling requires the avoidance of issues which are 
certainly connected to the main topic but whose inclusion in the analysis would prevent clear-cut 
results.” (Rubinstein 1995, p. 13). 
In 2001, Rubinstein returned to the methodological issue by discussing the use of 
experimentation in economics. His view on the mathematization of economics is apparently 
unchanged: 
 
The concepts which we attach to the mathematical symbols are the targets of economic 
theory. These are not the formal models that rather the concepts which appear in the 
interpretation. Economic theory is about the real world in the sense that these concepts 
are taken from our deliberations on the world. A good model is realistic in the sense that 
it orders our perception of real life social phenomena. It is realistic if it describes a 
situation as it is perceived by decision makers rather than as a presentation of the 
physical world. According to this approach models are not meant to be isomorphic with 
respect to reality but rather to the way in which the world is perceived by its inhabitants. 
And as economic theorists our goal is to clarify the connections between different types 
of concepts and arguments and patterns of reasoning. We attempt to ‘draw links’ (a 
phrase often used by Aumann) and ‘understand’, rather than ‘predict’. (Rubinstein 
2001, p. 618). 
 
One might wonder how this passage relates to experiments. The following excerpt is helpful: 
 
(…) when an economic model is based on intuitions about how people reason, 
experimental economics can verify that these intuitions are not extrinsic. Experiments 
serve as a test of the plausibility of assumptions and not conclusions. When 
experimental economics feeds economic models it can suggest new ideas about human 
reasoning in economic situations. (Rubinstein 2001, p. 619). 
 
A slightly disingenuous outline of Rubinstein’s view might be as follows. The only way to 
build consistent economic models is to describe how people’s minds simplify real experiences. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
economics.” (Rubinstein 2001, p. 616). 5 
Consequently, there is no escape from the complexity of the real world other than to resort to the 
theorist’s intuition, which aims to identify the true perceptions of decision makers. This 
corresponds to the identification of economic modeling as a thought experiment, in which the 
experiments can eventually refute the ‘extrinsicity’ of initial assumptions but which are ineffective 
in testing the conclusions of the models. However, if assumptions represent not facts but intuition, 
and thus cannot be verified, model results are also virtually irrefutable. 
This suggests a need to maintain the division between formalized and empirical arguments 
that has characterized mathematical economics since its inception. Whether axiomatization involves 
making precise deductions from given premises and verifying the logical adequacy of those 
premises, empirical evidence cannot refute an axiomatized economic model. Thought experiments 
do not admit contradictions because the theorist’s intuition fixes axioms and draws implications 
using a process in which internal consistency is the only check. Using this approach, as 
Rubinstein’s perceptive interpretation suggests, mainstream economics preserves its theories by 
removing the possibility of their empirical refutation. 
However, Rubinstein suggests a possible weakness of mathematical economics: “An 
economic model differs from a purely mathematical model in that it is a combination  of 
mathematical structures and interpretation. The names of the mathematical objects are an integral 
part of an economic model.” (Rubinstein 2001, p. 617). To be explicit, the mathematization of 
economics cannot avoid the issue of its empirical content just because economics is a social science 
in which the use of mathematics is never completely abstract. Any mathematical symbol or 
theoretical assumption always possesses an implicit or explicit empirical meaning that cannot 
always be translated into words. Economic models are therefore a mixture of formal reasoning and 
pseudo-empirical arguments that cannot be disentangled. In this framework, casual empiricism 
continuously produces scientific paradoxes, i.e., contradictions between theoretical predictions and 
empirical inferences based on common sense that can undermine economists’ confidence in the 
validity of their theories.3 
This perspective raises two issues. First, if axiomatics has been the prevailing approach in 
economics since the 1930s, to what degree have formal assumptions benefited from the lack of a 
                                                 
3 The popularity of this view among economists has been perceptively questioned by Robert J. Clower: “So unless 
axiomatics can be made to play a critical as contrasted with a constructive role, it is likely to be as little use to an 
empirical scientist as a broken saw to a carpenter. I suspect most economists regard paradoxes as foibles of our 
discipline; but because scientific paradoxes emerge only from theories that are not entirely devoid of empirical content, 
the thing to be regretted in contemporary economics is not the plenty but the paucity of paradoxes.”(Clower 1995, p. 
310).  6 
means to demonstrate its external (in)effectiveness? Second, does the emergence of paradoxes 
imply a weakening of this protective belt and a restoration of the empirical content of current 
economic theory? 
Rubinstein’s papers develop a framework within which to answer these questions not only 
because they outline the methodology of mainstream economics but also because they concern two 
formal tools, the introduction of which into economics were affected by these features. In their 
early periods, both game theory and experimental economics challenged some core beliefs of 
economic theory by revealing weaknesses that undermined their descriptive and normative validity. 
The implications of those criticisms were generally underrated primarily because economists were 
dazzled by the chimera of the absence of contradictions: “The twentieth-century yearning for an 
ironclad guarantee of the complete absence of contradiction in the marketplace (or perhaps more 
threatening: between the ears of the rational individual) was a mirage, little better than the 
nineteenth-century yearning for a perpetual motion machine. It was a machine dream; and dreams 
can sometimes be salutary, so long as they are never confused with conscious reality. As von 
Neumann had insisted, after Gödel everything would have to be different. There was only one 
proverb to broadcast to those fearing internal contradictions in their systems: provided there were 
no contradictions, then absence of contradiction would, of necessity, be undecidable.” (Mirowski 
2002, pp. 414–15). 
The aim of the next two sections is to examine in detail those historical processes and to 
assess the extent to which they were influenced by this methodological feature. 
 
3. STRATEGIC INTERACTION VERSUS INDIVIDUAL MAXIMIZATION 
Since its inception, game theory was considered a tool whose applications asked too much 
of human rationality. An authority on this subject, Herbert Simon, turned the early enthusiasm for 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Simon 1945) to disillusionment following his pioneering 
analysis of bounded rationality. According to Simon (1957), the approach of game theory was 
“wrongheaded” because it made the same mistake as neoclassical theory, which was “to erect a 
theory of human choice on the unrealistic assumptions of virtual omniscience and unlimited 
computational power.” (Simon 1957, p. 202). At the same time, he ascribed to game theory the 
following legacy: “the main product of the very elegant apparatus of game theory has been to 
demonstrate quite clearly that it is virtually impossible to define an unambiguous criterion of 
rationality for this class of situations.” (Simon 1957, p. 487–488). 7 
To acknowledge that game theory revealed that too many requirements must be met for 
economic agents to be maximizers was not exactly a criticism if it was addressed to the 
promulgators of the theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern. The first chapter of Theory of Games 
and Economic Behavior contains an instructive passage, often quoted but not always fully 
appreciated: 
 
Consider now a participant in a social exchange economy. His problem has, of course, 
many elements in common with a maximum problem. But it also contains some, very 
essential, elements of an entirely different nature. He too tries to obtain an optimum 
result. But in order to achieve this, he must enter into relations of exchange with others. 
If two or more persons exchange goods with each other, then the result for each one will 
depend in general not merely upon his own actions but on those of the others as well. 
Thus each participant attempts to maximize a function (his above-mentioned “result”) 
of which he does not control all variables. This is certainly no maximum problem, but a 
peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting maximum problems. Every 
participant is guided by another principle and neither determines all variables which 
affect his interest. This kind of problem is nowhere dealt with in classical mathematics. 
We emphasize at the risk of being pedantic that this is no conditional maximum 
problem, no problem of the calculus of variations, of functional analysis, etc. (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1947, p. 11). 
 
According to this statement, the founding fathers considered game theory as a device for 
demonstrating that the principle of individual maximization when applied to interacting agents 
could produce an outcome intended by no-one. Given this definition of optimal choice dependent 
on the assumptions made about other players’ choices, there was no straightforward principle of 
social rationality that could deal with the solution of games as constrained optimization did for 
individual choice. However, if the centrality of the assumption of self-seeking maximization were 
to be removed, the metaphysics of neoclassical economics would be seriously undermined.4 
The person responsible for this critical perspective was Oskar Morgenstern, who acted as a 
translator of von Neumann’s insights from mathematics to economics (Leonard 1995, Mirowski 
1992). He spent his scientific life critically assessing the methodology of neoclassical economics 
(Innocenti 1995). In 1941, shortly before Theory of Games, Morgenstern wrote a paper entitled 
Maxims of behavior that remained unpublished, probably because it represented the embryonic 
                                                 
4 “The research program of neoclassical economics is the challenge of finding a neoclassical explanation for any given 
phenomenon—that is, whether it is possible to show that the phenomenon can be seen as a logical consequence of 
maximizing behaviour—thus, maximization is beyond question for the purpose of accepting the challenge. […] 
Whether maximization should be part of anyone’s metaphysics is a methodological problem. Since maximization is part 
of the metaphysics, neoclassical theorists too often employ ad hoc methodology in order to deflect possible criticism; 
thus any criticism or defense of neoclassical maximization must deal with neoclassical methodology rather than the 
truth of the assumption.” (Boland 1981, p. 1035). 8 
formulation of the remarks co-authored with von Neumann quoted above.5 Even if this short 
treatise did not deal directly with the maximization problem, its main arguments aimed to weaken 
the normative validity of this assumption. Morgenstern’s starting point was the distinction between 
unrestricted and restricted maxims. The first is “one where its pursuit does not have to take into 
account whether other individuals do or do not accept and simultaneously follow the same maxim 
of behaviour” and consequently they are “purely formalistic” criteria (OMP, Box 49, p. 3). On the 
contrary, the restricted maxim states “will lead to the desired result […] provided that not too many 
persons act according to this same maxim at the same time.” (p. 4). By referring to the maxim of 
withdrawing money when economic crisis looms, “it will retain this objective rationality only if the 
number of people applying it remains sufficiently small. There exists a point where the maxim 
becomes invalid because of the fact that the withdrawal of funds by more persons will lead 
precisely to the event against which it is supposed to protect.” The implications were clear-cut: “the 
influence of great numbers upon the success or lack of success of the maxim is not quite obvious 
and would disclose itself only to a more careful study. Thus subjective and objective rationality 
may fall wide apart which probably constitutes the majority of cases.” (p. 5). 
Morgenstern pointed out another implication of his interpretation: “In order to point out to 
economists the nature of the questions treated in this paper and to show their relevance for some of 
the topics with which they are largely concerned, it might be suggested to replace the word 
“maxim” by “plan”. It will then become apparent that, e.g., the consistency of plans which is often 
being postulated as a condition of equilibrium is nothing but an extension of the points raised here; 
it would probably be advisable to conceive of a plan as a much more complex entity than they are 
understood to be in general.” (p. 21). 
Morgenstern’s remarks concern a problem that was significant for contrasting earlier game 
theory with the methodological status of contemporary economics: the inadequacy of the concept of 
equilibrium.6 It is hardly surprisingly that the word equilibrium was practically eliminated from 
Theory of Games. The postulate of equilibrium analysis is that economic agents choose the optimal 
                                                 
5 Urs Rellstab’s detailed account of Morgenstern’s diaries confirms this point: “On 17 May 1941, von Neumann asked 
Morgenstern to write a paper on ‘maxims’, referring to ‘maxims of behavior’, a topic that had been Morgenstern’s main 
interest since the beginning of their discussions.” (see 5 April 1940, OMPD). On the very next day, happy about von 
Neumann’s request, Morgenstern began work on the paper: “I have a mountain of notes (about the subject) and I will 
write a short paper, maybe 5000 words.” (17 May 1941, OMPD). “This paper, ‘the maxims’, had a direct impact on 
von Neumann’s decision to collaborate with Morgenstern. […] Although it was never published, Morgenstern wanted 
to publish it later on several occasions, and both von Neumann, and later Gödel, urged him to do so (28 January 1948, 
OMPD).” (Rellstab 1992, p. 84). 
6 Mark Blaug (2003) attributes to increasing concentration on the end state of the equilibrium by orthodox economists 
in the 1950s the contemporary fall of game theory in economics.  9 
action while assuming that other agents are rational, or, much the same, are maximizers. In von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s project, to solve a game did not mean to determine how opposing 
maximizing choices could be balanced by means of static assumptions about the behavior of others. 
Rather, they conceived of solutions as multiple and often indeterminate because in cooperative n-
person games the characteristic function was the outcome of the dynamic process of coalition 
formation. Rational behavior was consequently defined in terms of a process in which agents learn 
to calculate the benefits accruing to each player from joining every possible coalition. The ensuing 
concept of stable sets was defined as any subset of payoff vectors enjoying some desirable 
properties. However, within this set, players were not always able to determine the best alternative. 
von Neumann and Morgenstern approached this indeterminacy with a positive attitude because they 
were searching for the theoretical foundations of social science, in which indeterminacy was 
common.7 
Awareness of the inadequacy of the individual maximization hypothesis for the social 
sciences permeated the scientific community following Theory of Games. A contemporary source 
of evidence was Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions, which influenced the reception of social 
scientists to game theory.8 Its introduction contained skeptical remarks about the maximization 
criteria: “Though is not apparent from some writings, the term ‘rational’ is far from precise, and it 
certainly means different things in the different theories that have been developed. Loosely, it 
seems to include any assumption one makes about the players maximizing something, and any 
about complete knowledge on the part of the player in a very complex situation, where experience 
indicates that a human being would be far more restricted in his perceptions. The immediate 
reaction of the empiricist tends to be that, since such assumptions are so at variance with known 
fact, there is little point to the theory, except possibly as a mathematical exercise.” (Luce and Raiffa 
1957, p. 5). 
                                                 
7 “All these considerations illustrate once more what a complexity of theoretical forms must be expected in social 
theory. Our static analysis alone necessitated the creation of a conceptual and formal mechanism which is very different 
from anything used, for instance, in mathematical physics. Thus the conventional view of a solution as a uniquely 
defined number or aggregate of numbers was seen to be too narrow for our purposes, in spite of its success in other 
fields. The emphasis on mathematical methods seems to be shifted more towards combinatorics and set theory—and 
away from the algorithm of differential equations which dominate mathematical physics.” (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1947, p. 45). Even the reliance of Theory of Games on minimax was largely superseded by the opponents 
of Theory of Games (for example, Ellsberg 1956). This method was thought to be limited to zero-sum two-person 
games and its value was merely methodological. RAND’s emphasis on it cannot be ascribed to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. See, for example, Rapoport and Orwant (1962, pp. 2–3) and Mirowski (1992, p. 140). 
8 “A citation analysis of the literature in the social sciences between 1956 and 1965 suggests that R. Duncan Luce’s 
collaboration with Howard Raiffa in the publication of Games and Decisions (1957) was probably the most influential 10 
On these grounds, the question of how to define a choice as optimal had to be addressed 
cautiously: “The problem for each player is: what choice should he make in order that his partial 
influence over the outcome benefits him most? He is to assume that each of the other players is 
similarly motivated. This characterization we shall come to know as the normalized form of an n-
person game.” (p. 6). 
Games and Decisions also contains an extended discussion of the maximization of expected 
utility defined as the “postulate of rational behavior”. Luce and Raiffa defined it as “ix. Of two 
alternatives which give rise to outcomes, a player will chose the one which yields the more 
preferred outcome, or, more precisely, in terms of the utility function he will attempt to maximize 
expected utility” (p. 50). However, the meaning of this definition is intended to be merely 
tautological: “We shall take it to be entirely tautological in character in the sense that the postulate 
does not describe behavior but it describes the word ‘preference’.” The only alternative was “to 
accept certain experimental operations as defining ‘preferences’ and then to attempt to verify 
postulate (ix). This is basically much simpler for the experimentalist, but experience indicates that it 
is not always successful.” (p. 50). 
If the skepticism surrounding the descriptive validity of the individual maximization 
hypothesis grew out of the first laboratory experiments, its normative meaning was rediscovered in 
the same period by Nash. Today, game theorists generally agree that equilibrium points restore the 
concept of a balance of forces, i.e., equilibrium, as does the main device for predicting the outcome 
of a game, and in this way, it promotes the criteria of individual maximization as the key 
assumption of economic behavior.9 For example, Robert Aumann, in What is Game Theory Trying 
to Accomplish?, stated: “The Nash equilibrium is the embodiment of the idea that economic agents 
are rational; that they simultaneously act to maximize their utility. If there is any idea that can be 
considered the driving force of economic theory, that is it. Thus in a sense, the Nash equilibrium 
embodied the most important and fundamental idea of economics, that people act in accordance 
with their incentives.” (Aumann 1985, p. 43). Hence, the essence of mainstream economics 
coincides with the concept of Nash equilibrium because it assumes that each player maximizes 
individually, given the assumption that others also maximize. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
event in the literature of that period for the spread of game-theoretic thinking by the early 1960s.” (O’Rand 1992, p. 
188). See also Riker (1992, p. 216). 
9 Myerson’s article on the historical influence of the Nash equilibrium contains the following definition: “every 
member of society will act, within their domain of control, to maximize welfare as they evaluate it, given the predicted 
behavior of others. The concept of Nash equilibrium is, in its essence, the general formulation of this assumption.” 
(Myerson 1999, p. 1069). 11 
The viewpoint of historians is not very different. For instance, Mirowski argues: “There is no 
doubt that at this juncture Nash regarded himself as codifying a general principle of rationality from 
within the neoclassical tradition, as he then understood it; it bore no game-theoretic content or 
implications.” (Mirowski 2002, p. 336). Subsequently, he defined Nash’s equilibrium as “an 
attempt to extend constrained optimization of something which behaves very much like expected 
utility to contexts of interdependent payoffs.” (p. 339). 
This interpretation fits the opening lines of Nash’s paper on non-cooperative games: “[Theory 
of Games] contains a theory of n-person games of a type which we could call cooperative. This 
theory is based on analysis of the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed 
by the players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in 
that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or communication 
with any others. The notion of equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory. This notion 
yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a two-person zero-sum game.” (Nash 1951, 
p. 286). 
The equilibrium point was intended by Nash to replace von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
minimax criterion with a solution concept based on the maximization principle and on the idea that 
all players maximize. However, an analysis based on the hypothesis that players know how their 
opponents will act effectively removes the impact of social interaction on decision theory. This 
feature, per se, is a sufficient explanation because the community developing game theory in the 
1950s criticized the equilibrium point as a means of dealing with strategic choice. 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) can again be quoted as authoritative witnesses. Their discussion of the 
Nash equilibrium identified two major shortcomings. The first concerned the solution of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, in which “although a ‘rational’ player can do no better than play his 
undominated strategy (assuming a single-shot game without preplay communication), two 
‘irrational’ players always do better than two ‘rational’ ones.” Another example is the repeated 
version, in which “The unique overall equilibrium behavior demands that each player employ his 
undominated strategy on each trial, which seems contrary to ordinary wisdom.” The consequence is 
that the Nash equilibrium, besides being not universally applicable to non-zero-sum games, “is 
rejected as the basic tool for a normative theory”, even if “it may be of pragmatic importance in 
descriptive studies.” (pp. 111–112). 
   The second problem is the possibility of multiple equilibrium points: “[…] suppose that (σ1, 
σ2,…, σn) and (λ1, λ2,…, λn) are both equilibrium points of a general game, then, first, there is no 12 
assurance that an intermixture of strategy choices, such as (λ1, σ2, σ3,…, λi,…, σj,..., λn) is also an 
equilibrium point; and second, there is no assurance that the payoff to a player is the same for two 
different equilibrium points, i.e., in general: Mi(σ1, σ2,…, σn ) ≠ Mi(λ1, λ2,…, λn).” (p. 172). 
On this account, Luce and Raiffa’s conclusions are discouraging: “The failure of the general 
equilibrium notion to have these two properties raises much more serious questions as to its merits 
than could be raised against the minimax concept. […] First, if each player were to confine his 
strategy choice to those which are a part of some equilibrium n-tuple, the resulting problem faced 
by each player is again a game. It is a contraction of the old game, but it may be just as difficult to 
analyze conceptually as the original game. Indeed, in some sense it may be more difficult for a 
player to analyze it because it crystallizes the difficulties involved. Thus, the equilibrium notion 
does not serve in general as a guide to action.” (p. 172). 
The validity of the equilibrium point was questioned by Luce and Raiffa on normative 
grounds. In fact, in the following decade, Nash’s concept was rarely applied and was largely 
criticized using arguments similar to those quoted above.10 
To summarize, in the 1950s, some features that placed game theory in opposition to the 
toolbox of mainstream economists were already manifest. In particular, the assumption of 
maximizing behavior as the normative and positive foundations of the theory of individual choice 
was considered to be inadequate by those game theorists who were attempting to develop a social 
theory of strategic interaction. The focus on minimax as the criterion of rationality that 
characterized most game theorists at RAND was restricted to two-person zero-sum games. Beyond 
this specific case, there was no unifying principle for selecting the best choice. A multiplicity of 
solution criteria was proposed but none was seen as superior to any other. Nevertheless, in 
subsequent years, the utilitarian model was not revised. A widely held view was that game theory 
had little effect on economics because the results of its first applications were already known to 
economists. The original contribution to the progress of theory was irrelevant.11 What this position 
fails to recognize is that a call for revision of the postulate of individual maximization in earlier 
                                                 
10 In the first textbook on game theory, McKinsey wrote: “It must be remarked that Nash’s theory—although it 
represents a considerable advance—has some serious inadequacies and certainly cannot be regarded as a definitive 
solution of the conceptual problem of this domain.” (McKinsey 1952, p. 359). The same celebratory history of the Nash 
equilibrium written by Myerson (1999) admits that: “The impact of Nash’s reconstruction of game theory spread 
slowly.” (p. 1075). In the 1950s, exceptions to this lack of attention included the mathematical extensions of Nash’s 
equilibrium made by Glicksberg (1952) and the first economic applications by Shubik and Thompson (1959). 
11 The unsympathetic judgment of Dorfman et al. in Linear Programming and Economic Analysis exemplifies this 
view: “the 13 years that have elapsed since the publication of The Theory of Games have seen no important application 13 
game theory led economists to ignore the new method.12 The formal apparatus of mainstream 
economics relied on this assumption to such a degree that its validity was regarded as 
unquestionable. Moreover, the argument overlooks the fact that subsequently game theorists 
consciously pursued the replication of the same results that mathematical economists had already 
proved using other methods. 
Martin Shubik’s work was a key contribution to this interpretation. He deserves recognition 
for being the first economist to apply game theory systematically to economics. His 1953 PhD 
thesis, Competition and the Theory of Games, published with few changes as Strategy and Market 
Structure in 1959, provided an economic framework for game theory that incorporated virtually 
every subsection of contemporary handbooks of industrial economics. By quoting Morgenstern’s 
premise to his book, Shubik “goes baldly after pivotal problems, some time-honored and associated 
with the finest names in economics. They are freshly formulated in a game theoretical manner, and 
the new solutions are carefully compared with earlier answers.” (Shubik 1959b, p. IX). 
Notwithstanding his role as precursor, Shubik was the economist who proposed the first 
systematic adaptation of game theory to neoclassical economics. His 1959 paper on the identity 
between the core and Edgeworth’s contract curve induced Aumann almost 30 years later to write in 
The New Palgrave of Economics that “in 1959 came Shubik’s spectacular rediscovery of the core of 
a market in the writings of F. Y. Edgeworth (1881). From that time on, economics has remained by 
far the largest area of application of game theory.” (Aumann 1987, p. 467). 
In 1980, Schotter and Schwödiauer, by assessing the historical legacy of Shubik’s paper, 
ascribed to it the role of a vehicle for reawakening economists’ interests in the applications of game 
theory. At the same time, they argued that equivalence with Edgeworth’s model had revived a view 
that had already been expressed by many reviewers of Theory of Games: “While this result was 
quite elegant, it spelled the end of the first renaissance in game theory: It seemed that the game 
theoretical analysis (which employed strictly cooperative game theoretical concepts) was too 
demanding informationally to be of any intuitive appeal. Since it yielded no new results, little could 
be gained through its use.” (Schotter and Schwödiauer 1980, p. 480).13 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of game theory to concrete economic problems. The theory of games has had a profound impact on statistics and on 
military sciences; in economics it is still merely a promising and suggestive approach.” (Dorfman et al. 1958, p. 445). 
12 A slightly different view emphasizes the idea that game theory was unsuccessful because its promulgators, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern: “were alienated from economics and were in many ways quite hostile to what was 
considered to be acceptable economics.” (Weintraub 2002, p. 144). These two reasons must be kept separate. While the 
latter coincides with this paper’s interpretation, the former does not fit with the arguments herein. 
13 The 1948 review of Theory of Games published in the Economic Journal deserves quotation: “[the economic 
applications of game theory] are in line with those given by the ordinary theory, and in some cases may be a little more 14 
Based on this view, Schotter and Schwödiauer considered that the process of introduction of 
game theory into economics had come to a standstill that lasted until the late 1960s. Aumann (1987) 
attributed to Harsanyi’s 1967 Bayesian systematization of games of incomplete information, and to 
the final settlement of the so-called Nash program, the definitive acceptance of game theory. It is 
revealing that both these theoretical advances had nothing in common with the original inclination 
of game theorists towards the dismissal of the individual maximization principle. On the contrary, 
they revived this axiom by extending its applicability within the framework of game theory. 
Harsanyi’s contribution dealt with games of incomplete information using the same formal 
apparatus applied to complete-information games. This made the Nash equilibrium point applicable 
to games in which differences in players’ beliefs were not admitted by treating these as differences 
in players’ information. The development of the Nash program further extended the applicability of 
the Nash equilibrium, and consequently, of the hypothesis of constrained individual maximization, 
by providing a non-cooperative equilibrium foundation for axiomatically defined solutions of 
cooperative games. Hence, both motivations for the establishment of game theory as a founding 
part of economics were deeply intertwined with the criteria of self-seeking maximization. 
Normative economic theory extensively applied that part of game theory that did not conflict with 
its main assumption. The history dependence characterizing the status of mathematical economics 
also overcame the problem of the empirical validity of this hypothesis, which was already being 
questioned by the other subject of this paper, namely the coeval first attempts to introduce 
laboratory methods into economics. 
 
4. LABORATORY TESTS VERSUS PREFERENCE CONSISTENCY 
A comparison between the introduction of game theory into economics and the early years 
of experimental economics reveals many common features. Although the interplay between the two 
methods and economics is now considered a fruitful area of research, until recently, 
experimentalists experienced a surreptitious division between theoretical models and laboratory 
tests, some implications of which are explained by Alvin E. Roth: “When I began my own 
experimental work about a dozen years ago, it was most convenient to publish the results in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
general although the comparisons do not take account of the work on imperfect competition over the last twenty years. 
In view of this, it is to be regretted that the authors are in places less than generous to their colleagues who have 
tackled, not without success, these difficult problems with far less powerful tools.” (Stone 1948, p. 200). 15 
journals of psychology and business.” (Roth 1987, p. 1). The acceptance of experimental methods 
into economics was indeed anything but immediate. In the same paper, Roth delayed overcoming 
this ostracism until 1985, when the entry “Experimental Economic Methods” was added to the 
Journal of Economic Literature’s classification system. 
It is therefore not surprising that a detailed history of experimental economics has yet to be 
written. The first attempts to outline the evolution of the discipline (Plott 1982, Roth 1987a, Smith 
1992, Roth 1993, and Dimand, forthcoming) recognize three phases: the early years, dating from 
1948 to the early 1960s; the middle years, almost the whole of the 1980s; followed by a period of 
maturity. Chamberlin’s first attempt to test an imperfect market took the lead,14 while the next 
breakthroughs were Sidney Siegel and Lawrence Fouraker’s work on bargaining behavior and 
Vernon Smith’s reprise of Chamberlin’s experiment. During this period, game theory made a major 
contribution to improving techniques for testing economic models. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) and 
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) made key contributions to this advance. Their influence has been 
widely recognized in the literature (Friedman 1969, Smith 1992, and Roth 1995). The 
acknowledgment of game theory as the trait d’union between a well-established research field, 
market behavior, and the new analytical method of experimental economics is the main reason for 
this judgment, but there are other reasons. The first relates to the explicit consideration of 
information as a crucial experimental variable on the basis of the distinction between complete- and 
incomplete-information games. The second relates to the attention to detail in defining the rules of 
the games tested in experiments. The third involves the conversion of payoffs into salient cash 
rewards as a requirement for the validity of experimental findings. 
However, Siegel and Fouraker’s work is also noteworthy because it paved the way for the 
successive assimilation of laboratory experiments into economics. Their contribution corroborated 
some theoretical predictions of mainstream economics. In particular, Siegel’s research project was 
rooted in the social psychology of Kurt Lewin, which strongly influenced him. In the 1930s and 
1940s, Lewin also developed a theory that the functioning of the human mind can be explained by 
means of assumptions similar to those of expected utility theory.15 Siegel built on Lewin’s 
contribution by extending his dynamic model based on the concept of levels of aspiration to the 
area of subjective utility theory. Consequently, his main purpose was to define the experimental 
conditions that constituted a valid environment for testing neoclassical decision theory. Siegel and 
                                                 
14 The only predecessor of Chamberlin was Thurstone’s (1931) paper, which performed an experimental test of the 
existence of indifference curves, deservedly defined as an isolated fact. 16 
Fouraker (1960) showed a clear tendency for bargainers to maximize payoffs by selecting the 
Pareto optimal solution and dividing the surplus equally. This outcome became more likely when 
greater amounts of relevant information were available to the bargainers. Fouraker and Siegel 
(1963) confirmed the validity of the Nash equilibrium prediction in bilateral monopoly and 
oligopoly in different treatments. The interpretation given to the emergence of equilibrium points 
had a particular neoclassical flavor: “Lack of information favors an equilibrium solution, where 
each participant seeks the best individual strategy, given the behavior of the other participants. This 
condition tends to dampen communication, although there is a tendency towards rivalistic behavior 
as the number of participants increases. Even if appropriate Pareto optimal goals exist in such a 
situation, there is no efficient way of reaching them because they cannot be mutually recognized.” 
(Fouraker and Siegel 1963, p. 209). 
The trend for experimentalists to embrace the faith in mainstream economics was reinforced 
by Smith’s version of Chamberlin’s experimental imperfect market, which closed the early period 
of experimental economics.16 
Smith’s reference point was, by Chamberlin’s own admission, very modest: “The social 
scientist who would like to study in isolation and under known conditions the effect of particular 
forces is, for the most part, obliged to conduct his experiment by the application of general 
reasoning to abstract models. He cannot observe the actual operation of a real model under 
controlled conditions. The purpose of this article is to make a very tiny breach in this position: to 
describe an actual experiment with a market under laboratory conditions and to set forth some of 
the conclusions indicated by it.” (Chamberlin 1948 p. 95). 
Indeed, the realization of Chamberlin’s project was largely imperfect. It tested a “random 
meetings economy: more-or-less simultaneous bilateral bargaining with no opportunity for the 
complete multilateral dissemination of information, and no opportunity to learn by repeated 
exchange through successive market trading periods.” (Smith 1992, p. 243). He created an 
experimental imperfect market by using rough or largely unspecified rules: the market did not 
provide for either a protocol for the bargaining process or devices for motivating subjects. 
Therefore, the test was bound to raise more methodological problems than it solved for those who 
wanted to venture into experimentation with economic models. Nevertheless, Chamberlin’s 
exploratory attempt provided some evidence that the hypothesis of perfect competition may have 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 A detailed account of Lewin’s contribution is given by Mandler and Mandler (1969). 17 
been less empirically relevant than an alternative one. Moreover, its design introduced the 
technique for inducing individual reservation prices and aggregate supply and demand curves that 
was later applied by most experimentalists. 
By taking into account these considerations and the author’s prominence, it is surprising that 
“according to the Social Science Citation Index, Chamberlin’s paper was cited by other authors 
only four times between its publication in 1948 and its revival in 1962 by Vernon Smith.” 
(Bergstrom 2001, p. 183). As often happens, the historical recognition of Chamberlin’s experiment 
was due to its refutation. By introducing a sequence of trading periods instead of an uninterrupted 
series of exchanges and by using the double oral-auction procedure, Smith obtained a robust 
convergence toward competitive equilibrium in different versions of the experimental design. 
As in Siegel and Fouraker’s experiments on models of bilateral monopoly and oligopoly, 
Smith’s outcome corroborated the established theories in a way that appealed to mainstream 
economists. The community of interests based on the work of Sidney Siegel and Vernon Smith was 
documented in a letter written by Smith to the editor of the Journal of Political Economy on 
October 26, 1961: “Incidentally, I have just today met Sidney Siegel for the first time and I have his 
to-be-published material on experiments in oligopoly. The results are terribly interesting. 
Duopolists, who only know their own profit outcomes (incomplete information), go to the Bertrand 
competitive price solution. Triopolists do the same but faster. This suggests that my competitive 
price results might be achieved in still thinner markets. But the real shocker is the effect of 
complete information in which duopolists know each other’s profit outcomes. As the amount of 
information increases, duopolies decrease their tendency to the Bertrand competitive price. The 
invisible hand only works when it is invisible?!” (VSP, Box 14). Smith’s confidence in the 
robustness of his own results was further strengthened by Siegel’s work. 
Although there is no doubt that those contributions accelerated the methodological 
improvement of the discipline, the presumption they created represented a constraint for subsequent 
developments. On the one hand, a new methodology confirming what had already been shown or 
proved with other methods should have been more readily accepted, but on the other, the absence of 
immediate new results reduced the usefulness of making efforts to absorb the new technique. The 
prevalence of the latter argument probably had the effect of hindering the adoption of experimental 
techniques by economists, which instead was promoted by later developments, as I argue in the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 It is noteworthy that Vernon Smith’s (1992) historical reconstruction of the early years of experimental economics 
devoted a whole section to Siegel’s contribution in which this orthodox interpretation was supported (pp. 265–275). 18 
next section. However, before discussing this point, it is worth showing that the rejection of the 
conservative attitude was already present in the early years of experimental economics. 
In the 1950s, some experiments questioned some basic hypotheses of economic theory by 
using arguments that were to become more influential later. The two main topics of research were 
experimental gaming and individual choice. With regard to testing the predictions of game theory, 
the most common conclusion of experimental activity was that the observed results did not 
generally corroborate theoretical predictions. If game theorists themselves could not find optimal 
strategies in real laboratories, then von Neumann and Morgenstern’s stable sets, i.e., the Nash 
equilibrium and Shapley value, would have to be revised to take into account experimental 
evidence.17 
However, the major challenge to conventional economics came from the experimental 
investigation of individual choice. Debate about this issue was characterized by an effective 
criticism of the idealized behavior attributed to expected utility maximizers, and generally, to the 
idea that rationality in economics could be defined in terms of preference consistency. In the same 
period in which expected utility theory had become dominant, experimental work was producing 
robust evidence that contradicted its main assumptions.18 A common thread links the most notable 
contributions supporting this criticism, including contributions by Allais (1953), May (1954), and 
Edwards (1953, 1954). 
The Allais paradox is probably the most celebrated experiment in the history of economics. It 
started a new field of study that was to model modern decision theory. In 1953, the paradox 
identified some regularities of choice behavior that were later to give rise to the new discipline of 
cognitive economics. Nevertheless, the results of Allais’ experiments were interpreted by Allais 
himself as representing a paradox in his 1979 book, in which he proposed a “neo-Bernoullian” 
approach to economic choice to accommodate the violations of expected utility documented in 
1953. In the 25 years that elapsed between these two contributions, the reaction of decision theorists 
was merely a reassertion of the normative validity of expected utility theory over the descriptive 
one.19 However, Allais’ view, stated in the English summary to the article, was quite different: 
 
                                                 
17 The history of experimental gaming is outlined in Roth (1993) and Dimand (forthcoming). Rapoport and Orwant 
(1962) were the first authors to survey this literature. 
18 The coeval foundation of expected utility theory also had its experimental supporters, who are briefly reviewed 
below. 
19 A detailed account of Savage’s change of attitude on this issue is given in Jallais and Pradier (forthcoming). 19 
(5) If rationality is to be defined as adherence to one of the systems of axioms which 
leads to a Bernoulli type formulation, then obviously no discussion is possible. Such a 
definition, therefore, has no interest per se. That is to say that rationality, to be 
interesting from a scientific point of view, must be defined, in our opinion, in either of 
two ways. First, it may be defined in the abstract by referring to a general criterion of 
internal consistency employed in the social sciences, that is, a criterion implying the 
coherence of desired ends and the use of appropriate means for attaining them. 
Secondly, rationality can be defined experimentally by observing the actions of people 
who can be regarded as acting in a rational manner. 
(6) The principle of internal consistency implies only: (a) the use of objective 
probabilities when they exist, and (b) the axiom of absolute preference which states that 
out of two situations, one is certainly preferable if, for all possible outcomes, it yields a 
greater gain. Together these two conditions are less restrictive than the formulation of 
Bernoulli. Consequently, there are rational types of behavior (in the sense of rationality 
defined above) which do not obey the Bernoulli formulation. It cannot be said, 
therefore, that a rational man must behave according to the Bernoulli principle. 
(7) The experimental observation of the behavior of men who are considered rational by 
public opinion, invalidates Bernoulli’s principle. (Allais 1953, pp. 504–505).20 
 
Allais’ main purpose was to show that the definition of rationality in terms of consistency had 
to be dismissed as a normative explanation of economic choice. Thus, although the assimilation of 
his experiment as a counterargument limited to the descriptive validity of expected utility theory 
misses the point, it has essentially been dominant, at least since the 1970s. The first replication of 
Allais’ experiment was made 25 years later (Morrison 1967), but only Slovic and Tversky (1974) 
provided clear experimental evidence confirming the original paradox. A brief history of the 
ensuing “grudging acceptance” is provided by Camerer (1995) who postponed such acceptance to 
the 1980s for the following reasons: “These contributions got relatively little attention in the United 
States and England, both for sociological and scientific reasons. Their articles are bluntly critical of 
expected utility (and of some other alternative theories); I suspect many American readers are put 
off by the critical tone. Most of the work is published in book chapters or in journals like Theory 
and Decision and Journal of Economic Psychology, which are more widely read in Europe than in 
United States.” (Camerer 1995, p. 627). In fact, economists dealt with Allais’ view on rational 
choice by practically ignoring it. 
Another decision theorist who criticized expected utility theory by using experimental tests 
was May (1954). Specifically, he showed that it was possible to elicit intransitive preferences in 
                                                 
20 The conclusions of the paper are even more resolute: “Il résulte de tout ce qui précède que l’erreur fondamentale de 
toute l’école américaine, c’est de négliger indirectement et inconsciemment, la dispersion des valeurs psychologiques. 
[….] La négligence implicite par la formulation de Bernoulli de la dispersion des valeurs psychologiques a pour 
conséquence que cette formulation ne saurait être valable, comme l’a successivement prétendu l’école américaine, ni 20 
choices involving no uncertainty. He conducted an  experiment in which he asked students to 
express their preferences on three characteristics of potential mates, namely intelligence, wealth, 
and beauty. The choices were to be made between pairs of potential mates endowed with these 
qualities to various degrees. The results showed that students’ preferences were often intransitive. 
In the same paper, this finding was employed to reformulate Arrow’s impossibility theorem. May 
proposed a function of social preference with the properties of completeness, unanimity, and 
absence of dictatorship as in Arrow’s formulation but he replaced the property of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives with that of positive responsiveness, according to which a single individual 
can change his or her preference on a paired comparison without affecting the former social 
ordering. With this modification, May proved that simple majority rule was the only rule satisfying 
these four properties. May’s proof was mentioned in Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions 
(1957, pp. 357–359) as the starting point for subsequent work on the failings of majority rule that 
did not acknowledge its experimental basis. Evidence against transitivity had to incorporate the 
Nobel-prize-winning work of Kahneman and Tversky to constitute a different theoretical approach 
to rational choice. 
In the mid 1950s, Ward Edwards proved experimentally that individuals have preference 
orderings over probabilities: they prefer some probability values to others. For example, in some 
experimental trials, subjects overweighted 0.5. Moreover, Edwards found that both risk preferences 
and preferences over probabilities were relevant in determining choices. In bets with the same 
expected value, some subjects preferred losing large amounts of money with a low probability to 
losing small amounts of money with a high probability. Edwards stated clearly that preferences 
over probabilities implied that expected utility theory was useless, not only descriptively, but also 
normatively, because it did not generate adequate utility curves to explain the experimental 
behavior. In addition to this contribution to experimental economics, Edwards (1954) provided a 
comprehensive review of the economic theory of decision-making of the early 1950s that 
scrutinized virtually all variations of expected utility theory. Having reviewed the theoretical 
inconsistencies of this approach, Edwards pointed out that, to become meaningful, these criticisms 
had to be tested experimentally. Edwards believed that Allais had successfully showed how the 
hypothesis of expected utility maximization was violated when bets involved significant amounts of 
money, but Mosteller and Nogee’s (1951) experiment had supported the same theory by using small 
                                                                                                                                                                  
pour représenter le comportement de l’homme réel, ni pour déterminer sa satisfaction absolue (cardinal utility), ni 
même pour donner ‘une règle raisonnable de conduite à un home raisonnable’.” (Allais 1952, p. 544). 21 
monetary values and by ignoring the different effects of winning and losing bets. Even this 
argument was lost in subsequent appreciation of experimental work by leading decision theorists. 
To explain this lack of reaction, it is worth quoting Wallis and Friedman’s (1942) review of 
the first experiment on indifference curves made by Thurstone in 1931: “It is questionable whether 
a subject in so artificial an experimental situation could know what choices he would make in an 
economic situation; not knowing, it is almost inevitable that he would, in entire good faith, 
systematize his answers in such a way as to produce plausible but spurious results.” (Wallis and 
Friedman 1942, p. 180). This critical assessment was justified by the inadequacy of Thurstone’s 
design to motivate subjects.21  However, it also revealed that decision theorists were actively 
searching for a tool with which to test their models. Preston and Baratta (1948) made the first 
experiment to respond to Wallis and Friedman’s critique. The most cited experiment among those 
supporting expected utility theory, i.e., Mosteller and Nogee (1951), grew out of the celebrated 
discussion of utility analysis by Friedman and Savage (1948): “Plans for this experiment grew 
directly out of discussions with Friedman and Savage at the time they were writing their paper. W. 
Allen Wallis also contributed to the discussions.” (Mosteller and Nogee 1951, p. 372). In their 
paper, Friedman and Savage stated their aim in the following unpretentious way: “This paper 
attempts to provide a crude empirical test by bringing together a few broad observations about the 
behaviour of individuals in choosing among alternatives involving risk. […] At the outset it should 
be confessed that we have conducted no extensive empirical investigation of either class of 
phenomena. For the present, we are content to use what is already available in the literature, or 
obvious from casual observations, to provide a first test of the hypothesis and to impose significant 
substantive restrictions on it.” (Friedman and Savage 1948, pp. 282–283). The opening lines of 
Mosteller and Nogee’s paper seemed to offer a solution to this lack of empirical relevance: 
“Although the notion of utility has long been incorporated in the thinking of economic theoreticians 
in the form of a hypothetical construct, efforts to test the validity of the construct have mostly—and 
in many cases necessarily—been limited to observations of the behavior of groups of people in 
situations where utility was but one of many variables […] The basic assumptions outlined by 
Friedman and Savage for constructing utility curves are adopted for the analysis of the present 
experiment.” (Mosteller and Nogee 1951, p. 371–372). Mosteller and Nogee’s experiment found 
that subjects adhered to expected utility in 70% of the cases. Notwithstanding some methodological 
                                                 
21 This point is extensively discussed by Roth (1995, pp. 5–6). 22 
weaknesses,22 the paper gave rise to a series of laboratory tests that provided evidence confirming 
the same finding.23 The quantity and quality of this scientific production proves that experimental 
methods were judged as anything but useless. However, the proponents of expected utility theory 
considered this source of evidence positively insofar as it corroborated what they had proved by 
using thought experiments. However, by the early 1970s, experimental refutations of the expected 
utility paradigm multiplied. The effect was that theoretical work began to produce various 
generalizations of expected utility and alternative models to systematize such refutations. The 
impact of these developments is well known: it deserves recognition for the ‘official’ acceptance of 
experimental economics. The emergence of scientific paradoxes has had the beneficial effects of 
revealing the anomalies contained in the generally agreed definition of economic rationality and of 
suggesting different ways of reviving the empirical content of economic theory. However, this is no 
longer a historical issue; rather, it represents food for thought on the present status of economic 
methodology. 
 
5. PARADOXES VERSUS FORMALISM 
Today, it is widely acknowledged that game theory and experimental methods have 
enhanced the effectiveness of economics by revising its theoretical models and by extending its 
applications. However, this does not seem due to the corroboration of the hypotheses of 
conventional economics. On the contrary, it is attributable to the recent emergence of other 
paradoxes that have strengthened the arguments for considering the assumptions of maximizing 
behavior and of preference consistency as being descriptively implausible and normatively 
unsatisfactory. 
Game theorists have increasingly adhered to the view that strategic interaction cannot be 
dealt with merely by using the principle of self-seeking maximization. Today, the need to 
differentiate between individual and collective rationality is a growing concern: “Game-theoretic 
methods provide an intriguing alternative to treating a group as though it were a sentient individual: 
we can cast the members of the group as players in an internal organizational subgame, vying for 
control of the group’s actions in the larger game. It may be neither profitable nor necessary to 
                                                 
22 Camerer (1995, p. 620) discusses extensively the drawbacks of Mosteller and Nogee’s design. 
23 Rousseas and Hart (1951), Attneave (1953), Hurst and Siegel (1956), Davidson et al. (1957), Coombs and Komorita 
(1958), and Davidson and Marschak (1959). This literature is surveyed in Camerer (1995) and Roth (1995).  23 
regard the group’s corporate behavior as though it were governed by any kind of individualistic 
preference structure.” (Shubik 1982, p. 109). 
This change has been facilitated by the emergence of two strands of research that have 
reinforced the unconventional attitude of game theorists. The first is laboratory work on the 
Prisoner’s dilemma; and the second is evolutionary game theory. 
The great influence exerted by the paradox of the Prisoner’s dilemma is illustrated by its 
status as the key example in nearly all microeconomics texts used to introduce game theory to 
neophytes. This game represents the incarnation of the idea that the concept of individual rationality 
does not generalize in any unique or natural way to group or social rationality. By pointing out the 
inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium by means of similar arguments to those discussed in Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), the continuous, uninterrupted activity of laboratory tests of the Prisoner’s dilemma 
has seriously weakened the appropriateness of individual maximization as a normative principle of 
economic choice. The impact of this contradiction is significant to the extent that variations on the 
Prisoner’s dilemma have motivated the most influential applications of combining experimentation 
and computer simulation (Axelrod 1984). 
The other paradox is an intrinsic component of evolutionary game theory. In this approach, 
which was first developed by John Maynard Smith (1982), individual choice plays no role in 
determining the final outcome. The players of the game are two interacting populations. The main 
assumption is that there is no decision making at all. Any outcome is the result of a process in 
which individual maximization is eliminated and strategies themselves are modeled as opposing 
plays. The sole criterion of effectiveness is the increase in the expected number of the offspring of a 
certain population. In this way, the pivot of conventional economics is discarded. While mainstream 
economics deals with rational maximizing agents, evolutionary game theory analyzes how patterns 
of behavior emerge, diffuse, and stabilize. The dynamics chosen to elicit behavior are the 
population dynamics that replace individual choice as an analytical tool. The paradox is that in 
laboratory experiments, boundedly rational players in evolutionary models often outperform 
maximizing agents.24 
It is no accident that both approaches are closely connected with laboratory activity, which 
is the other source of paradoxes studied in this paper. The more recent history of experimental 
economics is characterized by the agreement of experimentalists on empirical findings that 
contradict the foundations of mainstream economics. The first is that preferences are highly context 
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dependent. Second, experimental subjects prefer fair payoffs to maximized ones.25 On this basis, 
experimental research aims to identify more precisely the motivational forces behind this evidence. 
Theoretical economists have taken into account this evidence by starting to question the definition 
of rationality in terms of a system of consistent axioms. Expected utility theory has been revised to 
assume not only normative but also descriptive value. The assumption of egoistic economic agents 
has been attenuated in various ways. Although this does not yet represent a general call for a 
revision of conventional decision theory, it has produced changes in economists’ ways of thinking 
that explain, for example, the incorporation of cognitive and learning processes as variables in 
economic models. 
Even if it is not the purpose of this paper to assess the methodological status of the 
discipline, some general implications of the paper’s arguments can be summarized. The advantages 
of formal mathematical reasoning in economics are listed in numerous papers. A recent survey by 
Backhouse mentions the following: “It enables researchers to build on the work of their 
predecessors in a way that would otherwise be impossible. Formal arguments are explicit and can, 
therefore, be understood by subsequent researches. The way is open, therefore, for economic 
knowledge to become cumulative.” (Backhouse 1998, p. 1852). 
This paper has attempted to argue that this cumulative process can become detrimental if the 
breaking down of complex chains of reasoning in explicit and easy series of steps referred to by 
Backhouse as the common characteristics of formalization, axiomatization, and mathematization in 
economics induces a crystallization of the theoretical assumptions to the point that they are not 
questioned.26 In this way, modeling is bound by past methodology. Once this process has ascribed 
to a formal assumption or to a set of methods the status of a core belief, it ceases to be questioned. 
The nature of the thought experiment, which characterize mainstream economics according to 
Rubinstein’s ‘perceptive’ interpretation, corroborates this crystallization by invalidating empirical 
evidence as a means of refutation. 
This analysis of the early years of game theory and experimental economics has two main 
implications. First, on the one hand, it led economists to neglect the criticisms that game theorists 
and experimentalists made of some fundamental hypotheses of mainstream economists, and on the 
other hand, led them to overvalue applications that corroborated those assumptions. Second, the 
                                                 
25 Ledyard (1995) and Schram (2000) present extensive surveys documenting that, in a variety of experimental 
situations, subjects deviate from own-payoff maximizing behavior.  25 
current growing diffusion of game theory and experimental methods is due to the emergence of 
other paradoxes that are even more manifest than those overlooked in the past. This historical 
evidence supports the main argument of this paper, namely that paradoxes are a useful tool with 
which to challenge the absence of contradictions that has characterized the use of formal 
mathematical reasoning in economics since the 1940s. 
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